Black Sea shipping: war risks and resilience
20 April, 2026
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Arthur Nitsevych, at Interlegal law firm, reports on Russian threats and ongoing port attacks in Ukraine as the war enters a fifth year
Throughout 2025 Russia continued its campaign of port infrastructure bombardment in Ukraine. According to Ukrainian officials, the frequency of strikes on the Odesa region’s ports roughly doubled in 2025 compared to the prior year. These included missile barrages and Iranian-made Shahed kamikaze drones targeting grain silos, oil terminals, port cranes and warehouses. The Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi (Yuzhny) harbours (the “Great Odesa” ports) were hit repeatedly, as were smaller Danube River ports like Izmail and Reni later in the year. In addition, nearly 800 air-raid alarms were registered in Odesa region through the year – representing a cumulative 30 days spent under air threat alerts. Since the invasion, Russian attacks have damaged or destroyed more than 500 port infrastructure facilities and 120 civilian vessels, injuring more than 150 civilians in or around the ports.
Impact on port operations: delays and adaptation While Ukraine’s ports stayed open, the efficiency of operations suffered under the constant threat. Exporters have had to build delays into their planning (when possible) and look for creative ways to mitigate risk. For instance, some port authorities began moving ships away from berths during air raid alerts as a precaution (especially if drones were inbound, to avoid damage to both ship and shore). Additionally, after a spate of Russian missile strikes on the regional power grid in December, ports invested in more backup generators and hardened shelters for personnel.
A major challenge has been power supply: strikes on substations are a big problem, because cranes, loaders and pumps are electric and energy-consuming, and standard diesel generators cannot fully support the heavy equipment needed to unload cargo. However, by late December, the situation, though difficult, was under control. Industry reports indicated no widespread panic among shippers; instead, a sober recognition that this disruptive environment was the “new normal”.
Whenever Russian attacks spiked, there was an uptick in enquiries about alternative routes (for example, sending cargo by barge from Ukraine’s Danube ports to Constanța, Romania). Those enquiries have largely been precautionary so far and have not resulted in mass diversions, but large exporters have contingency plans to reroute shipments via the Danube if Black Sea conditions deteriorate further.
“Strikes on substations are a big problem, because cranes, loaders and pumps are electric and energyconsuming, and standard diesel generators cannot support the heavy equipment needed to unload cargo”
Legal advisors have also been busy: exporters frequently consult lawyers on whether repeated port disruptions qualify as force majeure in their contracts. The answer has often been complicated. After nearly four years of conflict, war has become commonplace, but force majeure has not. Contracts governed by English law (eg GAFTA grain contracts) may not consider a port attack as excusing non-performance if alternative means to fulfill the deal exist, whereas under Ukrainian law the same incident could be deemed force majeure for port operators domestically. Each case requires careful analysis of the contract terms and applicable law. This legal wrinkle is yet another facet of the challenging business environment.
The three main deep-water ports of Great Odesa together handled more than 82.2 million tonnes of cargo in 2025. This volume is a testament to the ingenuity of Ukrainian logistics. The key point is that Ukraine restored direct Black Sea trade lanes even as Russia tried to close them through terror. This helped Odesa’s ports ramp back up from near-zero activity in mid-2023 to a robust pace by mid-2025. It also allowed container shipping to cautiously return, which proved crucial for high-value and niche cargoes.
Container shipping revival and port developments In addition to grain, general cargo and container trade through the Black Sea also saw a cautious revival in 2025. Early in the year major global carriers tested the waters: in February, CMA CGM – one of the world’s largest container lines – sent a vessel to Odesa, its first call since 2022. Around the same time, Turkey’s Medkon Lines resumed short-sea container service to Odesa. These moves were buoyed by improved security from Ukraine’s naval escorts and perhaps optimism that the “grain corridor” understanding might expand.
However, by mid-2025, Russia’s intensified port attacks caused some liners to pause operations again for safety. The summer brought a temporary dip in container calls as insurers reassessed risk after several ships in Odesa were damaged by drone debris and missile strikes. Despite the challenges, container volumes grew steadily. In October Ukrainian ports even set a post-invasion record for container throughput. By August the ports had handled 134,191 TEUs, already exceeding the entire 2024 annual count by 3.3 per cent. This was the highest container volume recorded since the war began, indicating a real recovery in this segment. The momentum continued into late 2025: in November, Israel’s ZIM shipping line announced it was returning with a direct Ukraine–Israel container service, the only direct route of its kind in the market.
What is the key hurdle for the container trade’s full comeback? First and foremost is security: when talking with both market participants and companies engaged in foreign trade, this risk is most often cited as the deciding factor for the return of container cargo to Great Odesa’s port infrastructure. In practical terms, this means many shippers are willing to wait or use overland routes rather than send containers to Odesa until they feel assured that ships will not come under attack or be trapped in these delays.
Amid these headwinds, Ukraine pushed forward with longterm port development plans. Notably, 2025 saw the launch of the first port concession project during the war. The Port of Chornomorsk, one of Odesa’s trio, is slated for a public–private partnership to modernise its facilities. Preparations began early in the year, with feasibility studies and consultations with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and International Finance Corporation (IFC). In September the government officially announced it would concession Chornomorsk’s biggest cargo area – the “First and Container Terminals”, including six deep-water berths – to a private investor for a 40-year term.
The ambitions for this project are high: the concessionaire is expected to invest “hundreds of millions of dollars” in new equipment and berth upgrades. In the lifetime of the deal, the state anticipates more than US$1.1 billion in revenues and fees, and the creation of more than one thousand new jobs with employment guarantees for current staff. Many welcomed the prospect of international investment and know-how, seeing it as a vote of confidence in Ukraine’s future. However businesses also criticised a lack of transparency and overly rosy projections. Even so, the initiative is important: it is a statement that Ukraine is planning for post-war reconstruction and not merely day-today survival. If the concession attracts a reputable international port operator, it could bring in new technology, efficiency and maybe even cargo traffic through global partnerships. If not, the process will at least identify obstacles that need fixing to make Ukrainian ports more investor-friendly.
Conclusion: lessons from 2025 The tumultuous events of 2025 in the Black Sea underscored the fact that global maritime trade is now influenced as much by geopolitical risk and security as by supply-and-demand fundamentals. In Ukraine’s case, the year forced a leap from crisis response to a durable new operating paradigm. Routes, insurance costs and logistics plans all had to be continually adjusted in light of military developments.
For Ukraine and its allies, the year demonstrated the value of innovation and courage in the maritime domain. By opening new corridors, employing drones in novel ways and tirelessly repairing infrastructure, Ukraine kept its sea lanes viable. Turkey, Romania and other Black Sea nations were put on notice by incidents such as the Bosphorus tanker strike – and while Turkey protested the danger to navigation, it also quietly started coordinating more on Black Sea security (eg by sharing more data on suspicious ships).
“For Ukraine and its allies, the year demonstrated the value of innovation and courage in the maritime domain. By opening new corridors, employing drones in novel ways and tirelessly repairing infrastructure, Ukraine kept its sea lanes viable”
Looking ahead, early 2026 finds no guarantee of rapid normalisation in the Black Sea. The conflict and its maritime dimensions are ongoing. However, there is room for qualified optimism. Ukraine’s ability to adapt under extreme pressure bodes well for its competitiveness in a post-war world. The hard-earned lesson of 2025 is that success in shipping (and trade generally) is no longer about just having the lowest cost or fastest route – it is about resilience and risk management. Companies that built flexibility into their supply chains, diversified their transport modes and invested in security measures managed not only to survive, but often to fulfill their contracts and retain global clients.
Winners are not those waiting for “ideal conditions”. They are those who built flexible, resilient logistics systems with risk management at their core.
